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I  Institutional architecture and intelectual controversy
　　The French social security system provides medical coverage through a statutory health insurance 
scheme for the entire population (66 milion inhabitants). This scheme comprises three distinct regimes: the 
Régime Général for salaried workers, the Régime des Indépendants for self-employed workers and 
professionals, and the Mutualité Sociale Agricole for farmers and agricultural workers. In addition to these 
employment-based systems, two specific regimes exist for people outside the labor market, and who are not 
co-insured as family members. Universal access to healthcare is organized through the combination of five 
distinctive levels:
　　
　　1．Compulsory health insurance (Assurance Maladie, hereafter referred to as AM). The founding 
principles are those of a Bismarckian social health insurance, based on professional status and work-
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related income. The AM is co-financed by a payrol-based contribution from employers, and, since 
1996, by an earmarked tax on the members’ entire income1.
　　2．Voluntary complementary health insurance (Assurance Maladie Complémentaire, hereafter 
referred to as AMC), operated by private organizations, which covers a large percentage of 
members’ health expenses that are not reimbursed by the statutory health insurance: approximately 
25%. Nearly the entire population (96%2) is affiliated to this type of AMC scheme. The high 
prevalence of AMC has a positive solidarity effect: it spreads the remaining costs over the entire 
population of AMC affiliates, which avoids the concentration of out-of-pocket payments on individual 
patients. Two-thirds of the AMC market is held by not-for-profit organizations. Many of them stil 
operate with the traditional income-based premiums, although they are now adjusting for age and 
number of co-insured family members, as for-profit complementary health insurers do. Only such 
limited risk selection is permited in France.
　　3．The list of serious and long-term ilnesses (Afection de Longue Durée: ALD) defines thirty-three 
categories of pathology, comprising more than 400 ilnesses, for which the AM reimbursement 
amounts to 100%. Access to this regime depends mainly on a medical decision, and doctors have 
often used the ALD arrangement to obtain ful reimbursement for their patients3. The rapid growth 
in the number of ALD beneficiaries reflects of course the growing impact of chronic disease, but it 
also indicates a need for a stronger medial safety net4.
　　4．Universal medical coverage (Couverture Médicale Universele: CMU5) has been in operation since 
2000. It was instituted by law in order to provide a unified safety net for those who are not covered 
by the AM and/or do not have the means to aford an AMC. The scheme comprises three layers, al 
subject to means testing: first, the “basic” CMU (hereafter referred to as the CMU-B), which 
provides access to the AM for people residing in France, who cannot be affiliated otherwise. If their 
income is below a threshold, they are affiliated free of charge. Second, the “Complementary” CMU 
(hereafter referred to as the CMU-C), which provides free afiliation to an AMC. Third, a cash benefit, 
the ACS (Aide au paiement d’une Complémentaire Santé), which is financial assistance for access to 
complementary health insurance. A “health voucher” is given to people whose income is low but 
exceeds the CMU threshold, in order to help them pay for their own complementary health insurance.
　　5．State medical assistance (Aide Médicale d’État: AME). Since undocumented migrants cannot 
benefit from the CMU, which is based on official residence in France, this specific regime was 
added to the CMU legislation. It serves anyone with administrative difficulties and needing medical 
care. The care basket is the same as for CMU patients.
　　One more regime should be mentioned here: humanitarian medical assistance. This purely private and 
very militant assistance focuses on particular groups to which the oficial institutions cannot reach out, or do 
so only with difficulty and poor results. The humanitarian organizations can receive public subsidies6 or act 
as service providers, negotiating their programs with local or central government, including the AM. They 
act as “fire fighters” in extremely marginalized populations or situations with public health risks (the 
homeless, isolated mentaly il individuals, people living underground, such as heavy drug addicts, migrants 
fearing expulsion, Roma communities, etc). Their work consists mainly in community organizing, and in 
offering the first point of contact for individuals in need. They provide translation and counseling, resolve 
administrative problems and guide patients to join the CMU and AME. Their action constitutes a necessary 
complement to the statutory regimes, for information and counseling, and thus acts as a form of “delegation 
of public services” (Maury, 2013).
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　　This article wil focus on the CMU regime and its by-product, the State medical assistance (AME)7. It 
wil examine how and to what extent these arrangements fulfil their mission of providing an effective 
medical safety net to the populations in need.
　　The CMU legislation was passed in 1999 with a broad political consensus among al major political 
parties, from the Left to the Right. Intelectuals however engaged in controversy underpinned by theoretical 
debates about the legitimate foundations of the new CMU arrangement, as wel as its articulation with the 
principles of social security and the “normal” health insurance system.
　　The links between a social health insurance based on entitlement, on the one hand, and safety-net 
arrangements with income thresholds, on the other, do indeed constitute a chalenging theoretical issue, 
because of the national differences in institutional frameworks and the political meanings they convey. The 
interesting question here is: to what extent are the concepts and theories of general significance, or limited 
to national and historical boundaries?
　　French intelectual debates in this respect can be summarized under three headings8. The first point 
concerns the links between social security and social assistance (Borgetto, Chauvière et Frotiée 2004; 
Chauchard et Marié, 2001; Desprès 2010; Lafore 2010): are they contradictory or complementary? Several 
authors see the CMU as a watershed in the history of the French social security system, a reform that 
“severs the relationship between citizenship and professional activity” (Frotiée, 2006: 12). However, as many 
have pointed out, this evolution was already initiated before the CMU, in 1988, when al beneficiaries of the 
minimum income support scheme were affiliated to the AM, automaticaly and free of charge. Others argue 
that the CMU is simply another step in the generalization of social security and AM coverage (Chauchard et 
Romain 2001). Lafore and Borgeto (2000) discuss the role of social assistance in the “République sociale”, in 
particular in connection with democracy, law and the reciprocity of duties. In this article it wil be argued 
that the CMU safety net is a pragmatic adaptation to new socioeconomic realities: an incremental process of 
modernization aimed at updating previously existing arrangements.
　　The second point of theoretical discussion concerns the concept of universalism, in relation to equity, 
equal chances, and the fight against poverty (Borgeto, 2000). In French, the term universalism commonly 
conveys contradictory meanings: on the one hand, it is understood as equal treatment, rejecting targeted 
schemes and policies; on the other, it refers to “access for al”, a goal which often cals for targeted actions 
in order to reach out to those in special need. In this context, analysts of the CMU often point out that the 
French health insurance does not reimburse the ful expenditure, which obviously constitutes a handicap for 
achieving universalism, and furthermore that universalism can only be based on residency, not on a 
Bismarckian-type of social health insurance. These arguments would suggest that the French healthcare 
system could not achieve universal coverage, because of the Bismarckian structure linked to employment, 
as wel as the important role of private providers and doctors who overcharge, on the one hand, and the 
refusal in public opinion as wel as in the policy networks to adopt a British-type of National Health Service, 
on the other hand. However, in empirical terms and by international comparison9, medical coverage in 
France stands out for its high level. As the statistics below show, the CMU has contributed to further 
improving access.
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　　The third point of the controversy theorizes a longstanding political debate opposing the social security 
institutions, conceived for and financed by the working population, on the one hand, to the tasks of 
“national solidarity” considered as being the responsibility of the national government, on the other. From 
the latter point of view, healthcare for targeted populations such as CMU beneficiaries should rely 
exclusively on “national solidarity” and be financed from general taxes. This perspective would however 
demand new organizational frameworks and could lead to a separate “public” distribution of medical care for 
the poor, e.g. a “two-tiered” healthcare system – an option that is not supported in France by politicians or 
public opinion. In empirical terms the question relates to organizational problems: which institution should 
be in charge of the management of the healthcare safety net and who should pay for it?
　　These debates need to be linked to the particularities of the French healthcare system, which does not 
easily fit the common categories used in international comparison. The French system has been described 
in various and contradictory terms: as half way between the Bismarckian and the Beveridgian models 
(Hassenteufel 2001), as mainly a “public-private mix” (Godt 1991); as a “neo-Bismarckian regulatory 
healthcare state” (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007); and as a system under direct government control (Rochaix 
and Wildford), with few veto points (Immergut, 1992).
　　To understand the articulation between the statutory AM and the medical assistance regime, one needs 
to focus on the relationship between the state, local authorities, and the social health insurance. In this 
perspective, the French healthcare system resembles a “Statist model of Social Health Insurance” (Matsuda 
and Steffen, 2013; Steffen 2010b). Furthermore, one needs to consider the important role that the private 
sector plays in the system. Its unique combination of universal access, free choice for the patients, private 
doctors and complementary health insurances, has been conceptualized as “Liberal Universalism” (Steffen 
2010a). Given this context, three key questions need to be answered: 
　　―　How is the residence-based safety net combined with the social health insurance?
　　―　How is the safety net articulated with private providers of care and insurance?
　　―　How is care and administration organized for non-registered residents?
　　In other words: Who pays for the care for the non-contributing population? What is the care basket for 
them? Who decides on these maters and how?
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Table 1: Healthcare financing, 2013
Origin of fundingShare in %Expenditure for Medical Consumption
Compulsory contribution 76.0Social health insurance
“Public” (in principle)1.4State (for CMU and AME)
Private premium, to not-for-profit 
organizations
7.3Complementary mutual health insurance 
Idem, for profit 3.9Complementary commercial health insurance
Idem, partly not-for-profit 2.6Complementary health insurance within contingency funds
Private individuals8.8Out of pocket
€2,843  per capita/annum100%187 bilion Euros (8.8% of GDP)10
Source: Zaidman et al. (2014: 19, 69―84)
I  Social Inclusion: Modernizing, Harmonizing, Centralizing
　　The law instituting the CMU and the AME, passed on 27 July 1999 and applied on 1 January 2000, did 
not start from scratch. It replaced the previous medical safety net operated under a law dating al the way 
back to 189311, which obliged local public authorities (municipalities, Départements) to provide medical care 
for the “poor” of their territory. The system was essentialy discretionary, without any national rules or 
guidelines being defined. Once a request for medical assistance had been approved by the local mayor or 
commission, the administration issued a document that the patient would give to the doctor, who would be 
paid directly by the local authority according to localy set rates. The system suffered from the medical 
profession’s reluctance to cooperate and from diferent conditions for access and benefits across the country. 
There was need for reform and unified rights, especialy as the labor market was changing and 
unemployment growing. The 1999 law transferred the responsibility for income testing12 from local 
politicians and social services to the local funds of the statutory AM. It set up standardized national income 
thresholds, varying only according to the size of the household, and fixed the list of benefits valid 
throughout the country. Free care thus became a right, and no longer assistance depending on the good 
wil of local politicians.
　　The CMU replaced not only the former local medical assistance scheme, but also “personal affiliation” 
to the health insurance scheme. The later type of affiliation had been created in the early 1980s for people 
who did not qualify for compulsory affiliation to the AM through employment. But as the personal 
premiums were very high, people tried to escape from this affiliation, which became a source of cheating. 
Former “personal” affiliates whose income is below the CMU threshold are now entitled to free affiliation. 
Furthermore, the CMU legislation constituted a political alternative to a more general reform planned in 
1995 by former Prime Minister Alain Juppé (from the right wing), for a “universal health insurance”, whose 
project was fiercely and successfuly fought by the (socialist) opposition and the trade unions.
　　The 1999 CMU law included a provision for undocumented residents and immigrants, who were 
excluded from the residence-based CMU scheme. Since the local medical assistance scheme had been 
abolished, undocumented migrants would be deprived of any access to medical care. The law therefore 
included a specific safety net, the Aide Médicale d’État (AME), mainly for ilegal foreigners, but it serves for 
any other person with administrative difficulties.
　　The CMU legislation was successfuly adopted and implemented, because it was part of a more general 
policy stream aimed at poverty aleviation. It enjoyed broad support from public opinion, in sharp contrast to 
the rejected Juppé plan. The CMU legislation also had an important forerunner: the automatic affiliation to 
the AM, free of charge, for al beneficiaries of the “Minimum Income support” instituted in 1988 by the 
(socialist) Prime Minister Michel Rocard. In 1998, when the socialists returned to power, a further law was 
adopted to improve “access to al fundamental rights” for people with low incomes. The barriers to access to 
medical care are wel known and regularly mentioned in reports: incomplete reimbursement and the 
necessity to pay for a AMC, the reimbursement system that obliges patients to first advance costs, and the 
possibility for many doctors to overcharge. Policy-making for the safety net was fueled by strong 
mobilization by humanitarian organizations working at the front line of public health issues in marginalized 
populations. Wel trained in mobilization, political lobbying and fund raising, these organizations argued that 
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a medical safety net had become a “social urgency”. They were listened to in the senior administration of 
the health ministry, and actualy participated in drafting the bil (Frotiée 2004).
　　The failure of the Juppé plan for a universal health insurance scheme, and the success of the CMU and 
its particular organizational arrangements which wil be analyzed below, ilustrate the difficulty of carrying 
out structural reforms in the healthcare sector, and the importance of incremental change building on 
existing institutions and inherited ideas and beliefs. The success of the new legislation was achieved 
through three practical measures: effective response to identified needs, clear common rules, and 
administrative simplification through a single reception desk.
　　The CMU-B provides free afiliation to the AM for smal income earners. In addition to this, the CMU-C 
offers free affiliation to an AMC. Both these parts of the CMU operate on the basis of official residence in 
the country and income testing13. Healthcare for beneficiaries is paid directly to the providers, without the 
patient having to advance money or to pay the out-of-pocket lump sums usualy required. In addition to this 
advantage, medicaly prescribed items that are normaly not reimbursed or only at a symbolic rate (e.g. 
spectacles, dental prostheses, hearing devices and other equipment), are provided free of charge to CMU 
patients, within price limits alowing for average quality standards. CMU and AME beneficiaries thus have a 
more extended cover for most medical needs than the contributing affiliates to the AM.
　　Residents whose income is slightly above the CMU threshold receive a “health voucher” (known as 
Aide pour l’acquisition d’une Complémentaire Santé, ACS) to help them to subscribe to a private AMC.
　　Applications for the different layers of the safety net – CMU, AME, and ACS – are al to be submited 
to and treated by the same local office of the AM. This single reception desk checks the documents, 
especialy the applicant’s income, organizes the payment of the ACS-health voucher, and issues the CMU or 
AME electronic health cards. These procedures need to be renewed annualy. Family members are affiliated 
according to the same rules as those governing the statutory AM.
　　For the CMU and ACS, the only documents required are proof of identity, residence (such as electricity 
bils or rent payments) and income (tax notification, social alowances, etc.14). For the AME, the 
requirement is proof of foreign nationality and of presence in the country for at least three months but for 
less than a year15 (hotel bils, witness testimonials). 
　　Two types of controversy accompanied the implementation of the CMU safety net.
　　The first concerned the income thresholds, criticized as being too low. Critics pointed in particular to 
the fact that people with income just above the thresholds would be excluded from the benefits of the CMU 
although their income would not be sufficient to pay for an AMC. The decision makers in the ministry 
responded in the folowing way: thresholds needed to be fixed with regard to other social minima and 
thresholds (minimum income, old-age social assistance, etc.), and to remain below them for reasons 
pertaining to public spending. This was seen as being socialy acceptable since not benefiting from a free 
AMC was less dramatic than losing the monetary alocation for everyday living costs. Ilness was not 
considered to be a permanent risk (CMU Fonds 2001: 3).
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　　Adjustments have however been introduced. Article 23 of the CMU law already obliges the AMC to 
keep any former CMU-C beneficiary at the same premium for at least another year after they have ceased to 
be eligible for the CMU scheme. During the year 2000, the government alocated a special public grant of 
€400,000 to the statutory health insurance in order to “help people at the CMU borderlines” (CMU-Fonds, 
Report 2001: 3). Local AM funds took various measures to soften the borderlines. It became general practice 
in the AM funds to accept candidates with income up to 10% above the threshold. The ministry then 
centralized these various initiatives, and added corresponding paragraphs to the law. In 2000, the principle 
was thus legalized that up to 10% above the threshold, people could stil benefit from the third-party-payer 
system, e.g. without having to advance money for care. The provision was later extended to one more year 
of membership of the CMU system after exceeding the income threshold (unless the person entered 
employment and could be insured under the regular compulsory system).
　　The most important adjustment was made by a law enacted on 13 August 2004, which introduced the 
ACS (health voucher) arrangement, applicable from 1 January 2005. This subsidy is given to al people with 
income above the CMU threshold, fixed initialy at 20% above16, then extended to 35% in 201317, in order to 
help them pay for their own AMC. The level of the ACS-subsidy varies with the age of the individual 
household members: for 2014, per year and person, it amounted to €100 for household members under the 
age of 16, €200 for 16-49 year-olds, and €550 for those over 60. This public subsidy may favor the 
commercial AMC market, with risk-adapted premiums, but most of the beneficiaries (84.7%) opt for the 
statutory health insurance as their complementary AM (CMU Fonds, 2013b: 36-37). CMU beneficiaries are 
the only persons for whom the public AM acts also as AMC. This particular provision may prefigure a future 
evolution of the French health insurance towards a catalogue of options in the health coverage, similar to 
those in the Netherlands and Germany.
　　The thresholds for the ACS “health voucher” benefit have been fixed at 60% of the net median income, 
which corresponds to the poverty line. The later is situated at €977 per month for a single person (CMU 
Fonds, 2013b: 18). Al together, the CMU and ACS thresholds remain low, which keeps the number of 
beneficiaries within limits. Thresholds had not been updated for years, when President François Holande 
(socialist) decided on a general upgrading of 8.3% from 1 July 2013. A further increase is planned but may 
not be implemented, given the high level of public debt.
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Table 2: Income Thresholds in 2013 (Mainland France)
ACS (“Health Voucher”)
in Euros
CMU and AME
in Euros
Household members
Per monthPer yearPer monthPer Year
97711,6707208,6451
1,45917,5051,08112,9672
1,75121,0061,29715,5603
2,04224,5071,51318,1534
2,43129,1751,80121,6115
+389+ 4,668+ 288+ 3,457Additional person
Thresholds for the French Oversee Territories are 12% higher
　　The second controversy concerned the articulation of statutory and complementary health insurance. 
　　To understand this particular French problem we need to bear in mind the folowing: 
　　―　The CMU-C arrangement is a necessary complement since the statutory AM reimburses only 
approximately 75% of medical costs, which applies also to the CMU-B. 
　　―　Most CMU beneficiaries choose the statutory AM as their point of affiliation for their CMU-C, 
despite the existence of the private AMCs.
　　An important ideological element in the French healthcare system is “free choice”. When the CMU law 
was in preparation, the humanitarian non-profit associations insisted strongly on the principle of future 
beneficiaries having “free choice” concerning the organization to which they would like to be affiliated for 
their CMU-C coverage. The aim was to “prevent stigmatization” that could arise from specific public care 
pathways for CMU patients. Senior government officials in charge of drafting the legislation were sensitive 
to this “normalization” argument. Consequently, at the time of admission to the CMU-C scheme, 
beneficiaries have to choose whether they want to use the statutory AM as their AMC, or be affiliated to a 
private AMC and, if so, to indicate which one. 
　　The issue became a tricky financial problem once the system was operating, because the public funding 
alocated by the government to the institutions affiliating the beneficiaries folows the beneficiary’s choice. 
Initialy, the public AM funds were reimbursed for their CMU expenditure at the real cost, whilst private 
AMCs received a fixed per capita sum, and had to support the financial risk themselves. Senior officials in 
the social security department of the ministry in charge of health promoted this option with a twofold 
argument: on the one hand that a safety net was a “national solidarity” mission and therefore to be financed 
by public authority and general taxes, but on the other hand that, as the beneficiaries would also be 
“clients” for the private AMCs, the government needed to pay only for the “affiliation”, not for the actual 
medical charges the affiliated CMU beneficiaries would incur. Opinions evolved when the 2004 law was 
drafted, to reform the health insurance in a more managerial sense. It was then decided that the state could 
“delegate” its mission of national solidarity to the statutory AM, and henceforth pay only a lump sum for 
each affiliated CMU beneficiary, instead of the ful expenditure (Frotiée, 2008: 14). The statutory AM was 
thus aligned with the private AMC. Wil this precedent open new windows for future AM reforms in France?
　　The indirect cost of the new legislation was considerable in terms of work force, job training, and 
creative institutional renewal. The local AM funds had to learn how to handle income testing and 
coordination with other social administrations, in particular tax offices, labor offices and the many AMCs. 
According to the first Evaluation Report of the CMU Fund set up specificaly for this purpose, the AM 
administration created 1,930 new stable positions (life employment) and in addition concluded 973 work 
contracts for limited periods (CMU Fonds, 2001: 3). With new rules and high public expectations, litigation 
also multiplied, especialy during the first year. In 2000, the commissions for arbitration processed 38,000 
CMU-related cases, nearly al of which contested the level of income18. Whilst most of the complaints were 
dismissed, at local or national level, the huge work of inquiry set a case precedent, especialy for income 
testing that constituted a major innovation in the French social security system. The government provided 
only general guidelines to the executives of the new system: remain flexible to avoid public anger, but keep 
thresholds modest to avoid exploding public budgets (CMU Fonds, 2001: 4-5).
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II  Beneficiaries, Expenditure and Funding
　　To organize, steer and manage the CMU system, the 1999 Law set up a new public agency, the CMU 
Fund (Fonds de Financement de la Protection Complémentaire de la Couverture Universele du Risque 
Maladie). The Fund organized the implementation of the law, and since then has had the task of monitoring 
the situation, writing detailed annual evaluation reports19, and making policy recommendations to the 
government and the social security institutions. Its main mission is to organize the financing of the CMU 
system. It colects the resources atributed to the system and alocates money to the institutions according 
to their number of affiliated CMU beneficiaries.
　　Up to 2012, the Fund alocated to the affiliating bodies an annual per capita lump sum of €370. This did 
not cover the real costs, which averaged €440 per beneficiary in 2013 (for CMU-C beneficiaries affiliated 
with the statutory AM; the only figures known). The 2013 law for financing the social security system fixed 
the annual lump sum at €400, but changed the rules to promote cost containment: the relevant institutions, 
both AM and AMC, are now reimbursed up to their real annual expenditure, but only within the limit of 
€408 (figure for 2014). 
　　The source of financing has evolved considerably. Initialy the government provided the funds, together 
with a limited voluntary participation of al AMCs. Folowing an agreement negotiated between the 
government and the national federation of the AMCs, the later participated with a “solidarity contribution” 
then fixed at 1.75% of their general turnover. The rate was raised twice: to 2.5% in 2006, and to 5.9% in 2009. 
A major change occurred in 2011 when the annual law for the financing of the social security transformed 
the contribution into a “tax”, labeled “Tax for Additional Solidarity” (Taxe de solidarity additionnele). The 
rate was set at 6.27% of the insurer’s turnover, payable by al AMCs, including those who did not have CMU-
C affiliates or did not participate in the scheme. This changed the rules of the game, since a tax is not 
negotiable but compulsory. The tax has to be paid to the office that colects business taxes, which transmits 
it to the CMU Fund. The AMCs protested, especialy the mutualist AMCs, arguing that they had a private 
and only voluntary membership, but the government stood firm.
　　As a result, the CMU safety net is not financed by general taxes, as such residency-based public safety 
nets usualy are, but almost exclusively by the private AMCs. The later integrate the cost increase into the 
price of their premiums, thus transferring the charge of a “national solidarity task” to their privately paying 
affiliates. The public input is limited to the recently decided atribution of a smal part (3.15%) of the tobacco 
tax.
　　Although it is difficult to know the precise expenditure for the safety net20, the total expenditure can be 
estimated at around three bilion Euros per annum. In addition to the financial transfers operated by the 
CMU Fund (2,097 milion Euros), the AME for undocumented residents represents €712 milion, and public 
subsidies to medical humanitarian non-profit associations another €100 milion. Furthermore, an unknown 
but non-negligible part of the 100% reimbursement within the ALD scheme (serious and long-term 
ilnesses)21 should be added because the ALD is sometimes used as a way to free patients from out-of-
pocket charges, as a social arrangement between the care providers and their patients.
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Table 3: Financial balance of the National CMU Fund, 2013
Receipts:               in milion €Expenditure:                   in milion €
2,066Solidarity Tax paid by the private 
complementary health insurance funds
1,581Payments to the statutory AM for CMU-
beneficiaries＊
352Part of the Tobacco Tax transferred 
by the government
264Payments to the private AMC for CMU-
beneficiaries ＊＊
16Unused service provisions
234Payments to AMC to compensate for 
“ACS” ＊＊＊
17Service provisions 
1Administration
2,434Total receipts2,097Total expenditure
Surplus, for reserves             + 337                 Final result:
Sources: Zaidman et al. (2014: 95), CMU Fund statistics for 2013  
＊　　 Transfers to the public AM: up to €440 maximum per CMU-C beneficiary.
＊＊　 Transfers to the private AMCs: up to €370 per beneficiary.
＊＊＊ Transfers to the private AMCs to compensate for their ACS expenditure on beneficiaries.
Table 4: Estimation of the total cost of the safety net for health, 2013
Financed by:In milion €Destination of expenditure
Total charges of the CMU Fund (tax on 
private AMC)
2,097Basic and Complementary CMU, and ACS 
(Health voucher)
State (central government)712AME 
       Total for the compulsory schemes:    2,809
Humanitarian organizations (central and 
local government)
100Public subsidies to private action
2,909      Total expenditure
Source: Author’s own calculation, on the bases of the figures of oficial reports on the CMU (CMU Fonds, 2013b) and 
Zaidman et al. (2014: 90-95).
Figure 1: Number of beneficiaries of CMU-B, 2007―2013
Source: Statistics of the CMU Fund (www.cmu.fr)
　　Figure 1 shows the sudden growth in the number of beneficiaries, since 2008 and 2009. This can be 
interpreted as a direct effect of the financial crises and the economic slow-down causing more 
unemployment. Since the beginning of the CMU scheme, the number of beneficiaries reflects exactly the 
evolution of unemployment, including geographical distribution (CMU Fonds 2013b: 35).
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Table 5: Beneficiaries of CMU-B
TotalOverseas TerritoriesMetropolitan FranceFrance
% of pop＊Number% of pop＊Number% of pop＊Number
2.21,407,82314.3261,0751.81,146,7482007
2.21,461,59214.4266,0511.91,195,5412008
2.81,856,91516.2302,0942.41,554,8212009
3.32,159,25316.6310,6992.91,848,5542010
3.32,191,85816.7314,5152.91,877,3432011
3.32,221,93118.2343,6572.91,878,2742012
3.42,242,48218.2344,1522.91,898,3302013
Source: Statistics of the CMU Fund
＊ Percentage of the total population
Table 6: Beneficiaries of CMU-C
TotalOverseasMetropolitanFrance
% of pop＊Number% of pop＊Number% of pop＊Number
6.84,398,06332.2589,4156.03,808,6442007
6.44,206,89431.0574,4885.73,632,4062008
6.34,154,66531.0577,2445.63,577,4062009
6.44,203,71130.3566,4775.73,637,2342010
6.54,315,59029.7560,7035.83,754,8872011
6.74,416,64829.6559,1926.03,857,4562012
7.04,623,36930.0566,1736.34,057,1962013
7.75,125,0002014 first estimation
Source: Statistics of the CMU Fund 
＊ Percentage of the total population
Table 7: Beneficiaries of the “Health Voucher”
% of total populationTotal numberOver the last 12 months
0.90597,892On 1 January 2010
0.96634,620Idem 2011
1.19784,575Idem 2012
1.541,014,209Idem 2013
1.761,160,863Idem 2014
1.781,173,3391 June 2014, latest available
Source: Statistics of the CMU Fonds
　　The number of beneficiaries evolves differently, depending on the scheme. It tends to reflect the 
economic situation as wel as the threshold effects resulting from policy decisions. Whilst the population 
covered by the CMU-B has grown slowly but steadily, the number of beneficiaries of the CMU-C remained 
at nearly the same level between 2007 and 2012, and even declined in 2008 and 2009, reflecting unchanged 
thresholds. It consequently increased immediately when the socialists returned to power and raised the 
thresholds. This effect is even stronger for the ACS beneficiaries, which exceeded the symbolic level of one 
milion beneficiaries in 2013. The number of beneficiaries of the CMU-linked schemes, including AME, is 
estimated at more than 8 milion people, i.e. approximately 12.5% of the population22.
　　Detailed analysis shows that the CMU arrangements benefit mainly young people, who are most heavily 
hit by unemployment in France. The majority are women. The geographical distribution shows a strong 
concentration in the French Oversea Territories, where CMU and AME beneficiaries account for up to 30% 
of the population, folowed by underprivileged suburban areas surrounding big cities, especialy Paris (13%), 
and the most de-industrialized regions (Nord and Mediterranean coast, where the rate is 10 to 12 %). The 
geographic distribution of the medical safety net is similar to that of the minimum income, which suggests 
that the medical safety net spreads where it is economicaly most needed.
　　The AME beneficiaries constitute the main subject of public controversy around the medical safety net. 
Their evolution in numbers reflects politics, in which immigration is one of the main subjects of electoral 
debate. This explains the restrictions introduced in 2011, and their immediate abolition after the 2012 
presidential election, when power passed from the Right to the Left:
　　―　an annual flat rate of €30 to be paid per adult beneficiary, 
　　―　the prior authorization of the AM for any hospital inpatient treatment,
　　―　the restriction of entitled family members to only (one) spouse and own children, excluding 
ascendants and siblings.
　　The AME has the same thresholds as the CMU, and alows access to al necessary care without 
payment. Furthermore, it includes several items of self-medication, but excludes thermal cures and artificial 
insemination. 
　　The number of AME beneficiaries was 284,000 in 2013. After a steady growth rate of 5.4% per year 
during the period from 2007 to 2010, the number suddenly declined by 8.4% in 2011, a pre-electoral year 
under President Sarkozy (right wing). With the arrival of the socialist President Holande, the number 
jumped up immediately, by 20% in 2012, and by another 12% in 2013 (Zaidman et al., 2014: 90).
　　Two problems regularly trigger controversy and a quest for beter means of control – generaly without 
any noteworthy success. First, it is very difficult to identify the real income of ilegal immigrants, and 
equaly difficult to identify the exact family relationships, especialy with migrants from countries with weak 
administrative systems, a common situation in Africa from which many migrants to France come. Second, 
the 2007 report of the Social Affairs Inspection Board on the AME regime found major abuse, and regreted 
that prosecution for fraud was rare, even when it was clearly identified (IGF/IGAS, 2007). Colaboration 
between the Police and the AM started, for the first time, after this report.
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　　A tricky everyday problem is that of asylum candidates, whose residency in the country is legal as long 
as no negative decision has been made. They thus qualify for the CMU scheme immediately on arrival. The 
AM administration however has difficulties distinguishing asylum candidates from ilegal migrants and tries 
to orient them, often wrongly, towards the AME scheme. A new and growing problem is to identify care 
seekers who use the asylum window to benefit from legaly provided free medical care for severe ilness and 
urgency, before a final negative decision is taken on their asylum demand, which may take several months 
or a year. These cases ilustrate the many practical difficulties in managing a coherent safety net that 
includes al residents, legal and ilegal alike.
IV  Assessing the French healthcare safety net
　　Despite intelectual criticism and practical shortcomings, the CMU is unquestionably a success story. It 
has organized a unified national and legitimate safety net that is more comprehensive and efficient than the 
previous local ones. As it is integrated into the common health insurance regime, it entitles beneficiaries to 
use the same care institutions and care baskets as the average contribution-paying patient. This 
normalization limits stigmatization, and transforms medical assistance into a legal right for ful AM coverage. 
It also guarantees the quality of care delivered to the economicaly more underprivileged population.
　　The comprehensive assessment of policy outcomes, including contradictory results, is a delicate task. In 
this empirical case, the framework developed by Bovens, ’t Hart and Peters for analyzing “success and 
failure in public governance” (2001), and the concept of “institutional fit” borrowed from EU studies 
(Guiliani, 2003) provide useful tools. These theoretical tools alow precise assessment by distinguishing 
three closely interwoven levels: programmatic, institutional and political.
Programmatic success and failure
　　In France the major obstacle to equal access to care is the incomplete reimbursement by the statutory 
AM, which makes it necessary to subscribe to an AMC. Therefore, an effective safety net must necessarily 
respond to this particular problem, as reports regularly point out (Jusot 2014). The CMU scheme focuses 
directly on this problem. According to the IRDES study (2010), only 4% of the general population stil has no 
complementary health insurance. Among these people that are not covered by an AMC and not eligible for 
the CMU scheme, less then 43% claim that they cannot afford an AMC, which represents less than 1.7% of 
the country’s population. The others state that they do not need one because they are already fuly covered, 
either by the ALD scheme or as a family member, or do not wish to have one, or lack information. Given 
the comparatively young average age of this population without AMC coverage (29 years old, compared to 
an overal average age of 41), one may suppose they enjoy rather satisfactory health conditions and 
consequently have relatively litle need for medical treatment. The main question then is whether the CMU 
reaches its specific target population, the poorest part of the population, when medical care is needed. The 
scheme is closely monitored, but two comprehensive indicators suffice to answer the question. One 
indicator is the socioeconomic distribution of the CMU-C. It shows two categories that together compose 
more than three quarters of al beneficiaries: “having never worked”, and “unqualified workers”. The CMU 
thus meets its target population. The second indicator is the comparative percentage of people who say that, 
for financial reasons, they have not sought healthcare at least once during the past year. This does not difer 
much between CMU-C beneficiaries and the general population with a private AMC: only 6% less for CMU-C 
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beneficiaries (Desprès et al. 2011: 2). This suggests that the reasons for not seeing a doctor are not 
specificaly linked to CMU shortcomings. 
　　Results concerning the ‘health voucher’ (ACS) show a more complex picture. In 2011, 78% of the 
potentialy entitled ACS beneficiaries did not bother to apply for it (CMU Fonds 2013a; Guthmuler et al 
2013). The high level of non-take-up suggests failure of the scheme to meet its goals. In order to identify 
the reasons, in-depth studies were conducted in Northern France over several years, including practical 
experimentation offering a higher subsidy, and improving information by inviting potential beneficiaries 
personaly to briefing sessions (Guthmuler et al. 2014, 2011, 2010). The first tests showed that the higher 
sum of money offered improved the level of take-up only slightly; a beter result, although stil modest, was 
obtained with a more effective strategy of information and communication. 
　　The studies revealed that many potential beneficiaries consider the administrative procedure as too 
complex to deal with, and too heavy compared to the expected advantage. Difficulties to understand 
administrative and practical problems, such as opening hours or transportation, have been identified as main 
reason for not applying for the ACS. One may conclude from this that the ACS scheme is not adapted to the 
most disadvantaged part of its target population, or inversely that the healthcare sector alone cannot correct 
the cumulated effects of general social inequality and weak inclusion.
　　Meanwhile, the amount of the subsidy has been increased. Information gaps and administrative 
problems have been identified and are currently being addressed. A precise gap has been identified since 
2009, when the minimum income scheme was reformed. Before the reform, affiliation to the CMU used to 
be automatic for beneficiaries of the original minimum income alowance, without them having to folow any 
procedure. By contrast, the reformed version (Revenu de Solidarité Active), which entitles beneficiaries to 
the public alocation in addition to a limited amount of work income, now obliges potential beneficiaries to 
declare their income to the AM, and thus to take a positive action to initiate their affiliation to the CMU or 
ACS. In its 2013 report, the CMU Fund recommends closer institutional colaboration between the AM and 
the employment agencies, in order to close this gap (CMU Fonds 2013b). It proposes an obligation for the 
local employment agencies to systematicaly inform their clients about the change in the procedure, and 
furthermore an automatic electronic transmission of the relevant data. Such data connection between 
institutions has however encountered significant public and political opposition in France. 
　　Despite these ongoing problems, the CMU seems to reach its programmatic targets, within the limits of 
the healthcare sector, without being able to solve al general problems such as weak administrative 
coordination, iliteracy, social exclusion, or cultural limits to the connection of data systems.
Institutional coherence
　　The question here is how the CMU scheme fits in with other institutional structures and principles. 
CMU thresholds remain very low, beneath the other social minima. This, the main shortcoming of the 
scheme, is an explicit policy choice linked to public cost containment. The AM has been cumulating deficits 
for two decades. Today it has become the main driver of the social security deficit, ahead of retirement 
pensions23. One may consider that low thresholds are a failure, but equaly that the CMU stands out as a 
success in a context where the national public debt exceeds the agreed European Union levels. 
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　　The CMU fits the institutional organization and power structures of the French healthcare system. This 
has made the scheme workable, but also explains its limits. As doctors are not alowed to overcharge CMU 
and AME patients, many try to keep them away from their practice. Contracts held by ACS beneficiaries are 
generaly of the cheapest category, and exclude the reimbursement of overcharged medical fees. The 
promised free choice of doctors is in reality limited for CMU beneficiaries. The CMU cannot remove the 
privileges of private medical practice, such as fee-for-service and overcharging, but it does promote the third-
party-payer systems for CMU and AME beneficiaries. Studies show that half of the reimbursements paid out 
by private complementary health insurance companies, that is, for contribution-paying members, concern 
ambulatory care of private doctors and dentists, folowed by non-vital medicines (Le Garrec et Bouvet 
2013:194). This patern contrasts with the predominant use of the emergency department of public hospitals 
by safety-net beneficiaries. 
　　The key institutional fit of the CMU is its provision of complementary health insurance. This takes away 
the need for a major reform, which would be necessary if ful reimbursement was to be granted by the 
statutory AM. Instead the CMU shifts the additional expenditure for the safety net to the contributing 
affiliates of the private AMC. The residency-based safety net does not invalidate the employment-based 
statutory AM. Residency as a criterion for affiliation is only subsidiary in France, that is, limited to the 
CMU. Furthermore, the public CMU does not contradict the dual architecture of the care offer, composed 
of a public hospital service and médecine libérale.
Political success and failure
　　Public opinion and al the French political parties support the CMU system. It is only now, with the 
effective reduction of public spending, that criticism is arising around the idea that CMU beneficiaries “get 
more” than those who work and pay contributions to the AM. The key point of controversy however is 
limited to a marginal but highly symbolic part of the system and the costs: the inclusion of ilegal migrants, 
that is, the AME scheme, and the related difficulty to control benefits and prevent abuse. The subject 
continues to fuel electoral debate. This is harmful both to the beneficiaries and to the development of the 
CMU/AME system. The controversy wil grow however with the massive arrival of migrants and refugees in 
Europe.
　　To sum it up, there is sufficient evidence to support the argument of success. On the programmatic 
level, the safety net is reaching those for whom it was designed. On the political level, public opinion and 
official reports continue to approve the scheme. On the institutional level, the CMU folowed a complex 
public-private mix, in line with the architecture of the French healthcare and health insurance systems. The 
fact that general features of the healthcare sector and a rather high level of social inequality, in general, 
limit equal access to healthcare, and that electoral debate spreads into the health sector, does not mean a 
failure for the CMU. The CMU has been relatively successful in problem-identification, policy-making and 
implementation. The failures are spilovers from general national politics. The CMU responds to a social 
need, and rests on a more general policy of securing basic rights for poor people.
　　Three lessons can be learned from the French CMU case. 
　　―　First, the CMU is one of the rare examples where ful rights have been formaly integrated into a 
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social assistance program (Lafore 2008). The case indicates that the boundary between social 
assistance and social security can become blurred, despite current international trends towards a 
deepening separation. 
　　―　Second, the CMU shows how reform-resistant healthcare systems, such as the French one, can 
adapt to new needs and conditions. The process of change is incremental, botom-up and pragmatic 
in terms of public expenditure.
　　―　Third, the CMU may be more than just a medical safety net. It is part of a “new generation of social 
rights” (Gazier, Palier et Périvier 2014), responding to a socioeconomic evolution characterized by 
more unstable jobs, working poor, and youth unemployment. In this context, it provides an example 
of how a social health insurance system and centralized state regulation can interact to secure 
universal access to health insurance and care.
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Notes
1 This “general social contribution” (CSG – Contribution sociale généralisée) was first introduced in the mid-80s 
as a smal complementary contribution on al non-work-related income, and was then gradualy extended. A 
1996 reform replaced the work-related contribution fuly by a “general” social contribution on al income, 
including social benefits, interest from capital, rent from assets, etc.
2 Figure for 2010, the latest available: htp://www.irdes.fr/EspaceEnseignement/ChiffresGraphiques/Couverture
 Complementaire/DonneesGnles.html (consulted 10.02.2015)
3 Although to a lesser degree today, this “social diversion” of a medical regime has constituted a top priority for 
cost control since the 2000s. The atribution of the ALD benefit is now closely controled by the National Fund 
of the AM, and by the High Health Authority (HAS – Haute Autorité de Santé).
4 The number of ADL beneficiaries grew from 3.7 milion in 1994 to 9.2 milion in 2011, which represents nearly 
one seventh of the population. 
5 For the sake of legibility, the French term and its acronym “CMU” wil be translated throughout this article as 
“Universal Medical Coverage”, although it is an arrangement that guarantees access to comprehensive health 
insurance coverage.
6 The biggest humanitarian organization, specialized in medical assistance and militancy, Medécins du Monde, 
has an annual budget of approximately 65 milion Euros, of which 40% is public finance (subsidies, service 
contracts) and 60% private fund raising (street colection, campaigning for donations), (Maury, 2013: 252).
7 Given the difficulty of translating the names of institutions, I have opted here to use the original French 
abbreviations CMU and AME. The abbreviation CMU refers to the regime as a whole, comprising: the “basic” 
CMU (CMU-B) or the “complementary CMU” (CMU-C).
8 Whilst international literature on the CMU is rare, French literature on the subject is abundant. In addition to 
the publications quoted in this paragraph, cf. Frotiée 2004, 2006, 2008; Borgeto, 2000; Lafore, 2008; Kerleau, 
2012. 
9 In 2000 the World Health Organization (WHO) rated the French system as offering “the best overal 
healthcare”, as regards waiting lists and universal equal access (WHO, 2000).
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10 The French total health expenditure is much higher: 250 bilion Euros, nearly 12% of the GDP (2013). 
“Medical Consumption” (Biens et Services Médicaux) is the smalest statistical category used in French health 
statistics: it counts the expenditure for medical care and prevention devoted to the individual patient, excluding 
pay for sickness leave, long-term care, administration, research, training, and investment. Furthermore, the 
way to calculate the GDP was revised in 2010: with the former calculation, the medical consumption would be 
+0.3% higher, amounting to 9.1% of GDP in 2013 (instead of the 8.8% mentioned above).
11 This is the famous 1893 Law creating the “Aide Médicale Gratuite” for “indigents”. For details see: Renard 1995.
12 The term “income testing” is used in this article, since only income is considered for the admission to the 
CMU, not assets.
13 The information used here and in the folowing pages is taken from the original French oficial documents: the 
legal texts, the reports and statistics of the health ministry, the IRDES (Institut de Recherche et de 
Documentation en Economie de la Santé), the Cour des Comptes, the inspection board for social affairs IGASS 
(Inspection Générale des Afaires Sociales), the CNAM (Caisse Nationale de l’Assurance Maladie) which is the 
AM national fund, and the CMU Fund, especialy its Annual Evaluation Reports (available via the Fund’s 
website: www.cmu.fr).
14 Al income is taken into account, of al the members of the household: income from work and capital, social 
benefits, pensions, and furthermore rent-free housing and any other free commodity.
15 The “three-month” delay aims at preventing abuse through “care-immigration”. The limit was fixed in 
accordance with the limits of visa regulations (especialy concerning family visits). Militant associations 
continue to fiercely criticize this delay, on grounds of medical urgency. In practice, in cases of emergency the 
necessary care wil stil be delivered, authorized on a case by case basis. 
16 The initial 2004 project of the (right wing) government was to increase the CMU-threshold by 10%. The first 
draft of the 2004 bil specified +16%, and the final version voted by Parliament was +20%. This ilustrates the 
low level of the threshold, and the stil high public sensitivity for more solidarity when ilness is concerned 
(Guthmuler et al., 2010: 5).
17 An electoral promise of President Holand, implemented immediately after his election. The government’s plan 
to extend this to 44.5% has so far not been implemented because of the high level of public debt.
18 Of these 38,000 complaints, in 12,000 cases the decision was revised by the local commissions, and 260 were 
judged after appeal at the national level, of which 60 received a revised decision in favor of the plaintiff (CMU 
Fonds, Evaluation Report 2001: 4-5).
19 The Fund’s reports provided most valuable information for this article (reports available at www.cum.fr).
20 It is impossible to isolate the real costs for medical care of CMU beneficiaries within the accountancy system 
of the private AMC (CMU Fonds, 2013b)
21 In 2009, the ALD concerned 15% of the affiliated members of the statutory AM: 8.6 milion people, consuming 
nearly 60% of the expenditure of the AM (Dourgnon, Or, et Sorasit 2013: 1-2). The number of ALD 
beneficiaries had grown to 9.2 milion in 2011.
22 The National Fund of the AM (CNAM) indicates (website: www.ameli.fr) that double counting is possible, 
between the CMU-B and -C, for probably 1.5 milion beneficiaries. It estimates the corrected number of both at 
5.8 milion beneficiaries. That is together with ACS and AME beneficiaries 11.9% of population.
23 The deficit of the statutory HI amounted to 6.8 bilion Euros in 2013, compared to the deficit of 3.1 bilion for 
the statutory pension fund. The deficit of the HI is expected to grow fast: to 7.3 bilion in 2014 and 10.5 bilion 
in 2015, against an improvement of the deficit of the pension fund (-1.6 and -1.4 bilion respectively) 
(Commission des Comptes de la Sécurité sociale, 2014:12, 17-19)
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　１９９９年の法改正によりフランスでは，貧困者に対するさまざまな医療扶助が刷新され統合された。この法
により法定健康保険制度に無料で加入が行われるようになるとともに，無料あるいは補助金を受け取って補
完健康保険制度に加入することが可能となった。つまり，無所得ないし低所得の人々は無料の医療アクセス
を手に入れたのである。新しい制度は，医療機構についての理論的検討では対立する要素と考えられている
もの，つまり普遍主義，選択，所得制限，を組み合わせたものである。このフランス独特のやり方は，貧困か
らの救済と公費支出の管理という二つの政策の潮流の妥協によって生まれている。結果として，特定の税を
介し，私的な補完保険の資金によって賄われる統一された公的セイフティ・ネットとなった。本論文は，ま
ず制度的な文脈と関連する理論上の論争を概観する。次に政策形成の過程を分析し，普遍的な医療給付の編
制（CMU-Couverture Maladie Universele）を記述する。３つめの部分では，受給者，財政，支出に焦点をあ
てる。４つめの最後の部分では，改革結果の成否を検討する。そこでは，緩やかな所得制限があるとはいえ
医療セイフティ・ネットが実質的に改善したこと，滞在資格を持たない移民については今もなお議論がある
ものの，この法制を支持する広範な政治的コンセンサスが生じたこと，そして社会扶助を法的権利とする制
度上の通常化が生じたこと，が述べられる１）。
キーワード：医療セイフティ・ネット，普遍医療給付，普遍医療給付制度（CMU），滞在資格を持たない移民，フラ
ンス
１）本抄録の翻訳は松田亮三（立命館大学・産業社会学部）が行った。なるべく読みやすい日本語となるよう一
部意訳してあることをお断りしておく。
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